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Daniella Casseres*

South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC:
Investors’ Desperate Plea for Second Circuit
Standards

In South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC,1 the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether South Cherry
Street, an investment fund, could bring a securities fraud claim against its
investment adviser, Hennessee Group, for recommending that the fund
invest in a Ponzi scheme.2 The Second Circuit dismissed South Cherry
Street’s securities fraud claim because South Cherry Street failed to plead
sufficient facts to meet the scienter requirement.3 The Court erred in finding
that South Cherry Street did not meet the scienter requirements
promulgated under Rule 10b-5 or the Second Circuit because Hennessee
Group’s failure of duty to monitor established scienter.4 Despite the Court’s
failure to find scienter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated the
right standard, which should be followed by other circuits because it strikes
the appropriate balance between deterring fraud and preventing illegitimate
claims.5

© 2011 Daniella Casseres
*
J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. 573 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 99–100.
3. See id. at 104, 114 (holding that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals saw no error in the
rulings of the district court, and dismissing South Cherry Street’s claims).
4. See infra Part V.A.,B.
5. Id.; See infra Part V.
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II. The Case

A. Factual Background
In 2001, investment advisers, Hennessee Group LLC (“Hennessee”), gave a
presentation to inexperienced hedge fund investors, South Cherry Street,
LLC (“South Cherry”), describing its process for evaluating and
recommending hedge funds.6 In its presentation, Hennessee discussed its
due diligence7 process before recommending a fund, and its on-going due
diligence after recommending a fund to an investor.8 South Cherry and
Hennessee entered into an oral agreement9 whereby Hennessee would
recommend suitable hedge fund investments to South Cherry that passed
Hennessee’s due diligence evaluation.10 Hennessee also agreed to provide
ongoing due diligence on funds that it recommended to South Cherry.11 In
exchange, South Cherry agreed to pay Hennessee an annual commission of
1% of each investment made as a result of Hennessee’s recommendation.12
Hennessee suggested that South Cherry invest in a hedge fund named
Bayou Accredited (“Bayou”).13

6. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 100.
7. Hennessee’s
[D]ue diligence process with respect to such funds included the following five levels of
scrutiny prior to its recommendation of such a fund for investment: (1) collection of
information about the fund's manager; (2) assessment of the fund's ‘Experience,’
‘Credibility,’ and ‘Transparency’; (3) interviews of hedge fund ‘[p]ersonnel from the
top down" at the fund's offices to give HG a sense of "overall professionalism, attitude
and depth of organization’; (4) study of the fund's ‘[i]ndividual positions,’ with an
emphasis on its long, short, cash, and derivative positions, as well as any ‘[o]ff balance
sheet transactions’; and (5) review of ‘audited financial statements,’ checks of the
fund's key personnel's references, confirmation of the fund's prime banking
relationship, and measures to "Verify Auditor.’
Id.
8. Id. at 100–01.
9. Id. at 101. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
legally enforceable contract pursuant to the New York Statute of
performed within one year. Id. at 108.
10. Id. at 101. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
legally enforceable contract pursuant to the New York Statute of
performed within one year. Id. at 108.
11. Id. at 101.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 100.
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Hennessee represented to South Cherry that Bayou’s “legendary”
trader, Samuel Israel III, had been a principal at another large hedge fund,
Omega Investments.14 Hennessee also told South Cherry that Bayou was
independently audited by Hert Herson & Co.15 South Cherry invested
$1.15 million in Bayou between the spring of 2003 and the spring of 2005
based on the recommendation of Hennessee.16 Hennessee sent South
Cherry monthly reports as to the status of their investment in Bayou, the
last of which stated that South Cherry’s investment had appreciated from
$ 1.15 million to about $ 1.5 million.17
In September 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) reported that Bayou was part of a Ponzi scheme.18 Bayou had lost
millions of dollars and had lied to investors about “the [f]und’s performance
and the value of investors’ accounts.”19 South Cherry lost its $1.15 million
investment in Bayou.20 All of Hennessee’s representations to South Cherry
about the Bayou Fund were false.21 Samuel Israel III was not a head trader
at Omega Investments.22 Hert Herson & Co. had not been Bayou’s auditor
since 1998, and the new auditor was not independent because Bayou’s
principals owned the auditor.23 Bayou had consistently lost money during
the period that South Cherry invested in the Fund.24

14. Id. at 101.
15. Id. at 102–03.
16. Id. at 101–02.
17. Id. at 102.
18. Id. A Ponzi scheme is when a fund promoter pays returns to existing investors from funds
contributed by new investors, and the fund has little to no legitimate earnings from which it is
paying returns to existing investors. Ponzi Schemes— Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). Ponzi
schemes generally collapse when the fund has no new investors or many investors decide to cash
out of the fund simultaneously. Id.
19. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 102.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Israel has been a mere order taker at Omega Investments. Id.
23. Id. at 103. Bayou’s principal, Daniel Marino, was also a principal of Richmond, Fairfield
& Associates, and the firm that audited Bayou in 2003. Id.
24. See id. at 102 (stating that “[t]he SEC reported that ‘Bayou Fund in fact lost millions of
dollars in every single year it traded.’”).
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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B. Procedural History
South Cherry brought a securities fraud claim in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York under § 10(b)25 and Rule 10b-5 of
Securities and Exchange Act of 193426 against Hennessee “for
misrepresenting the financial status and performance of the Bayou funds.”27
The district court dismissed the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6),
finding that the investors failed to plead scienter.28 The district court held
that South Cherry failed to establish that Hennessee knew of the Ponzi
scheme or that Hennessee intended to deceive South Cherry, and therefore
did not meet the standard of conscious recklessness or fraudulent intent
necessary to plead securities fraud.29 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that South
Cherry failed to meet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”)’s heightened pleading standards.30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 set up
the most basic legal standard for a plaintiff’s cause of action in a securities
fraud claim.31 Additionally, in 1976 the Supreme Court in Ernst v.
Hochfelder32 required the plaintiff to show scienter, which it defined as the
intent to deceive, defraud or manipulate.33 Since then, the scienter
requirement has evolved differently in various circuits.34 In 1995, Congress

25. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq (2000).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
27. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103.
28. Id.
29. In re Bayou Hedge Fund Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 405, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
30. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d. at 104.
31. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that SEC
Rule 10b-5 “delineates what constitutes a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”).
32. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
33. Id. at 193.
34. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
numerous courts have considered the PSLRA pleading standard issue with split results); In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA
imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standards);
Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537–38 (2d Cir.1999)(holding that the PSLRA
codified Second Circuit standards; Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th

234

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

D C
passed the PSLRA,35 the interpretation of which is still controversial among
different circuits.36
A. §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 Give
Plaintiffs a Private Cause of Action to Bring a Securities Fraud Claim
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 work
in conjunction to regulate the disclosure of securities information to
investors.37 The Securities Act of 1933 seeks to provide disclosure about
securities that are sold in interstate and foreign commerce.38 The purpose of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to regulate securities exchanges39
and over-the-counter markets40 on which securities are sold.41 The

Cir.1997) (holding that the PSLRA codified Second Circuit standards); Voit v. Wonderware
Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D.Pa.1997) (stating that the District Court for the Third Circuit
believed The PSLRA imposed more stringent pleading standards than the Second Circuit
approach).
35. 104 Pub. 67, 109 Stat. 737.
36. See infra note 70.
37. As defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a security is:
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, reorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a ‘security’; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006).
38. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§77a–77aa
(2006)).
39. A securities exchange is a financial market where securities are traded. Glossary,
VIVENDI, http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/Glossary (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
40. A security traded in some context other than on a formal exchange is referred to as a
trading in an “over-the counter” market. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/o/otc.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). “[O]ver-the-counter can be used to refer to stocks
that trade via a dealer network as opposed to on a centralized exchange. It also refers to debt
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enforces disclosure requirements for
regulated securities.42 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC, implements §
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which allows individuals to
hold corporations liable for engaging in deceptive practices by giving the
SEC the ability to civilly prosecute anyone who makes an untrue statement
or who omits “to state a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.”43 Case law proscribes a private cause of action for a
plaintiff to bring a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.44 A
plaintiff may bring a private action if he can plead that: (1) a defendant
made a false representation of a material fact or omitted material
information; (2) the plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation; and (3) the
defendant acted with scienter.45
1. Materiality
A fact is material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in
making an investment decision.46 There must be a substantial likelihood
that the misrepresented or omitted fact would have altered an investor’s
decision.47 A court may look outside of the complaint in order to determine

securities and other financial instruments such as derivatives, which are traded through a dealer
network.” Id.
41. 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq. (2006).
42. See supra note 40.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 305–06 (2d Cir.
2000)(noting how Rule 10b-5 specifies actions prohibited by the 1934 Act, such as making “any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . .”
Individuals have a private right of action to bring their own securities fraud cases under SEC Rule
10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). The SEC, however, also has the ability to bring civil cases
against securities offenders on behalf of individuals affected by fraud. Novak, 216 F.3d at 305–06.
44. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (holding that a private cause of
action for damages exists under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but only with an allegation of intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud).
45. See id. at 202 (stating that Rule 10(b) requires conduct involving scienter).
46. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (holding that public statements
denying merger negotiations and denying any corporate developments that would account for
heavy trading activity in its stock were material to investors who decided to sell their stock after
the public denials).
47. Id. (noting how there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been considered by the reasonable investor as significantly altering the “total
mix” of information made available).
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the importance of information to a reasonable investor.48 In determining
materiality, a court weighs the probability that an event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event “in light of the totality of company
activity.”49 If the magnitude of an event would have immediate importance
to investors regardless of whether or not the event ultimately takes place,
the information surrounding the event is material.50 This means that
materiality is determined on a case by case basis.51
2. Reliance
A successful 10b-5 claim must show reasonable reliance on the material
misrepresentation.52 As set forth in Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 53
reasonable reliance requires “a causal nexus between a misrepresentation or
omission and the plaintiff’s injury” and a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
reasonable person standing in his or her shoes would have relied on the
misrepresentation or omission.54 In testing reasonable reliance, courts may
consider:
(1) whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties;
(2) whether the plaintiff had the opportunity to detect the fraud;
(3) the sophistication of the plaintiff; (4) the existence of long

48. See Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) (considering
documents outside of the complaint to determine whether an amended complaint fairly stated a
claim under Rule 10b-5 because the documents were central to the allegations of wrongdoing, had
been submitted on defendant’s original motion, and had not been questioned in terms of their
authenticity and accuracy).
49. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
50. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 451 (1976) (noting that the standard
“does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote”). In TSC Indus., Inc., Defendant omitted
material facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC. Id. at 442. Defendant failed to
disclose the positions in TSC held by National's president and executive vice president, and
reports filed with the SEC by National and TSC indicating that National may be deemed a
“parent” of TSC. Id. at 451.
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F. 2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that each
case must be approached on its own facts).
52. See Straub v. Vaisman and Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that
scrutiny of the plaintiff’s actions are in the context of materiality, reliance, and reasonableness).
53. See Paracord Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996).
54. Id.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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standing business or personal relationships; and (5) the
plaintiff’s access to the relevant information.55
Additionally, in securities fraud cases, reliance is presumed based on
the fraud-on-the-market theory, 56 which assumes that the market price
relied on by investors reflects any material misrepresentations or
omissions.57 Therefore, plaintiffs do not need to show that they
personally relied on the defendant’s fraudulent statements.58 Reliance
may also be presumed if a 10b-5 claim is based on a failure to disclose
information.59 However, this presumption only applies if the failure to
disclose involves an omission of fact “as opposed to affirmative
misrepresentations.”60 A plaintiff’s failure to disclose a fraudulent
scheme may be regarded as an omission that creates the presumption of
reliance.61
3. Scienter
Scienter is the “intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”62 This requisite
state of mind implies that at the time that a defendant made an alleged
misrepresentation or omission, he or she had knowledge or a reasonable

55. See Straub, 540 F.2d at 598 (finding reasonable reliance when an investor invested based
on the recommendation of a securities broker). The court stated that even a sophisticated investor
“is not barred by a claim of reliance upon the honesty of those with whom he deals in the absence
of knowledge that the trust is misplaces.” Id. The court also stated that “knowing that [the
plaintiff] had confidence in [the broker], [the broker] abused this trust to promote a transaction
with which otherwise would have been received with caution.” Id.
56. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988).
57. See id. at 224 (1988) (creating a presumption of investor reliance based on the theory that
investors presumably rely on the market price, which typically reflects the misrepresentation or
omission); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the purpose of courts’ use of the “fraud
on the market” theory).
58. See Basic, 485. U.S. at 246, 249.
59. See generally Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
60. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. The fact that investors signed certain clauses in transaction documents may render
reliance unreasonable as a matter of law. See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court found clauses discharging warranties as to the
accuracy or completeness of information renders reliance unreasonable).
62. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
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suspicion of fraud.63 If a defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a
securities fraud solely by inaction, the plaintiff must also prove that the
defendant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of fraud.64
Similarly, the courts hold that a defendant’s failure to monitor must be
accompanied by an intent to aid in the fraud in order meet the scienter
requirement.65
B. The PSLRA Codified the Second Circuit’s Pleading Standards and
Imposed Additional Requirements to Heighten Pleading Standards
In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA66 to limit frivolous securities law
suits brought by individuals in response to the growing number of meritless
securities fraud suits seeking to attain quick settlements.67 Congress
addressed the problem through heightened pleading standards,68 which
makes cases more likely to get dismissed for failure to meet pleading
requirements, and protects corporations from high volumes of litigation any
time a corporation’s stock price decreased.69 The PSLRA set a baseline of a
“strong inference” requirement for scienter;70 however, since the PSLRA
did not define how to prove a “strong inference” the definition of scienter
under the PSLRA has been hotly debated among different circuits.71

63. Id. at 197 (stating that “[t]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with
‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
intentional misconduct”).
64. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir. 1974).
65. See Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a
non-fiduciary accountant will only be liable for securities fraud if his reckless conduct
approximates an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetuated by an audited company).
66. See S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737,
747 (1995) (stating that the plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).
71. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000); see supra note 40.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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1. Pleading Scienter Pre-PSLRA
Prior to the PSLRA, the Supreme Court in Ernst v. Ernst72 held that in
order to bring a claim under 10(b) and 10b-5, a plaintiff had to prove more
than mere negligence.73 The Second Circuit enabled a plaintiff to prove
scienter by pleading facts that gave rise to an inference of either a
defendant’s fraudulent intent or recklessness.74 Prior to Congress passing
the PSLRA, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs must allege facts that
give rise to a strong inference of scienter.75 An inference of fraudulent
intent could be drawn from facts showing that the plaintiff had a motive and
opportunity to commit the fraud.76 This could be shown by the defendant
gaining a benefit from the purported fraud.77 According to Second Circuit’s
pre-PSLRA standards, a plaintiff could show a strong inference of scienter
by alleging that defendants “benefitted in a concrete and personal way from
the fraud, engaged in deliberately illegal behavior, knew facts or had access
to information suggesting that their public statements were not accurate, or
failed to check information that they had a duty to monitor.”78 For example,
in Goldman v. Belden,79 plaintiffs demonstrated defendants’ fraudulent
intent by showing that defendants made false statements to inflate a

72. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
73. Id. at 210 (holding that "judicially created private damages remedy under §10(b) . . .
cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent
wrongdoing.").
74. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a “strong
inference” of fraudulent intent could not be deduced from the results of prior inspections because
prior inspections had stated that the company was doing well. Thus defendant’s statements about
high prospects for the company could have been made in reliance of prior inspections.).
76. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Regulation, 9 F.3d 259, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
that one way that a plaintiff can plead scienter without direct knowledge of the defendant’s state
of mind is “to allege fact establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so”).
77. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that prePSLRA pleading standards describe “[m]otive [as] . . . entail[ing] concrete benefits that could be
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged”).
78. See id. (stating that pre-PSLRA pleading standards describe motive as concrete benefits
that could be realized by false statements or wrongful disclosures, and opportunity means the
likely prospect of achieving these concrete benefits); In Re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 270 (finding
that motive was proven when defendants talked up the price of the company’s stock in order to
soften the dilution of the stock price).
79. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
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company’s stock price and defendants would benefit concretely from higher
stock prices because they owned company stock.80
After Goldman, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs must make
specific factual allegations before a court will presume that incorrect
predictions about a company, such as predictions about inflation of stock
price, are made with fraudulent intent.81 In addition, the Second Circuit in
Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc.,82 emphasized that in order to allege a
strong inference of intent, defendants must have benefitted personally.83
For example, defendants may benefit concretely by misrepresenting
information in order to keep the stock price of the corporation high while
selling their own shares for profit.84 In Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,85
the Second Circuit held that the fact that some people in a company
received compensation as a result of a misrepresentation to an investor
regarding a loan portfolio does not satisfy the motive and opportunity
element necessary to prove scienter.86 However, if management were to
misrepresent loan portfolio values in order to sell their own shares before a
price decrease, this direct economic benefit would satisfy the motive
requirement.87
While the First and Seventh Circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s
reasoning of the “strong inference” requirement,88 the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits did not require a strong inference to satisfy the scienter
requirement.89 Rather, prior to the PSLRA, scienter was inferred by

80. Id. at 1070.
81. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1131.
82. 174 F. 3d 79 (2d. Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 85.
84. Id. (discussing allegation that defendant corporation officer sold off large portions of his
stockholdings during the time of misrepresentations as probative of motive and supporting a string
inference of fraudulent intent).
85. 25 F.3d at 1130.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that a complaint
must set forth specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that a defendant knew that a
statement was materially false or misleading); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th
Cir. 1990) (stating that a plaintiff’s conclusory statements alleging defendant’s actual knowledge
of the materially false and misleading statements and omissions or reckless disregard for the truth
were not a sufficient showing).
89. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994); See Leoni v. Rogers,
719 F. Supp. 555, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that securities fraud claims must state “the
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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pleading fraud with particularity that a fact was false or misleading.90 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “plaintiffs may
aver scienter generally. . . that is, simply by saying that scienter existed.”91
It was sufficient to allege that scienter existed without setting out the
circumstances from which it could be inferred.92 Nevertheless, in order to
allege scienter it was necessary to set out circumstances indicating that a
defendant made a false or misleading statement by stating what was false
about a statement and why it was false.93 Plaintiffs satisfied this
requirement by setting forth the false statement and offering
contemporaneous statements proving the inaccuracy of the statement.94
The Second Circuit held that conscious recklessness could be proven
by showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the fraud.95
For example, in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.96 the plaintiff met
scienter when he presented evidence showing that the defendant had
assured him that his investment securities were satisfactory despite being
circumstances constituting fraud with particularity” and that “[m]alice, intent knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally”).
90. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiffs
sufficiently pled securities fraud by alleging with particularity that the Company’s SEC
reports had misrepresented the company’s losses. The court did not discuss motive and
opportunity or recklessness. The plaintiffs alleged:
that prior to the April 2 announcement, the Company and three of its top-ranking
officers intentionally misrepresented the financial condition of the Company, in
particular its expansion program's prospects for enhancing the Company's earnings. The
Complaint cite[d] various public statements-either prepared by the Company itself
(Shareholder Reports, Form 10-Qs, Form 10-K, newspaper interviews) or prepared by
securities analysts with the approval and guidance of the Company-and allege[d] that
these statements created the impression that the Company was successfully expanding
its retail warehouse operations when, in fact, the Company's expansion program was
failing.
See also In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1545–47(finding that plaintiffs may plead scienter
generally by merely requiring that the complaint state that scienter existed).
91. In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1546.
92. Id. at 1545.
93. Id. at 1548.
94. Id. at 1550 (finding that plaintiffs satisfied the scienter element by pleading that an
issuer’s SEC filing stating no net losses on sales of its subsidiaries was false and by offering as
proof of falsity, contemporaneous statements, made at board meetings, indicating that the
environment for sale of its subsidiaries was unfavorable).
95. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding
that reckless disregard of facts that defendant should have known, but for failure of duty to
monitor, satisfied scienter).
96. 570 F.2d at 38.

242

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

D C
aware that the quality of securities being purchased on behalf of his client
were very low and the defendant’s constant interaction with the purchaser
of securities was such that he had the opportunity to inquire or check on the
validity of the purchases.97 The Second Circuit found that the pleading
standard for scienter was met under the guise of conscious recklessness
when the plaintiff alleged that his investment adviser had a duty to monitor
and “the investment adviser responsible for the plaintiff’s portfolio ‘knew
what he was doing’ but never actually investigated” the funds he was
recommending for investment.98 In Rolf, an investor’s broker “by virtue of
repeatedly reassuring the investor of his confidence in an investor adviser
who was mishandling the investor’s portfolio and by virtue of his reckless
disregard as to whether his assurances of confidence were true or false”
participated in the investment adviser’s securities fraud.99
2. Pleading Scienter Post PSLRA
Congress enacted the PSLRA as a reaction to an increasing number of
“strike suits”100 arising in circuit courts that brought undesirable social and
economic costs.101 The PSLRA heightened securities fraud pleading
standards by requiring that plaintiffs allege a “strong inference” of scienter
with “particularity of facts,”102 and that the inference of scienter must be at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of non fraudulent
behavior.103

97. Id. Plaintiffs did not plead fiduciary duty; however, the District Court stated that it was
clear “that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty [were] present.” Rolf, 424 F.Supp. at 1024.
Defendant by virtue of being a broker dealer owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff investor. Id. at
1036.
98. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47–48.
99. Id. at 44.
100. Strike suits are law suits filed with the intention of inducing quick and large settlements
from corporations, which were eager to settle rather than incur the litigation costs. See Blue
ChipStamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–42 (1975).
101. See S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 4 (1995).
102. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2nd Cir. 2000).
103. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007) (holding
that “[t]o determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts giving rise to the requisite
‘strong inference’, a court must consider plausible nonculpable explanations for the
defendant's conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff. The inference that the
defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, but it must be more than merely
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a. Particularity
To survive a motion to dismiss a securities fraud claim, the plaintiff’s
claims may not be merely conclusory.104 For example, in Eurycleia
Partners, Limited Partnership v. Seward Kissel, 105 the New York Court of
Appeals found the plaintiff’s claim that a defendant law firm committed
fraud was conclusory because it lacked any firm factual findings relevant to
the defendant’s knowledge of any fraudulent scheme.106 In order to support
a statement with particularity, a plaintiff must specify each statement that is
misleading, the reasons it is misleading, and facts that support the belief
that a statement is misleading.107 In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs,
Inc.,108 the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff would sufficiently plead
that a defendant’s statements were misleading by stating the facts that
misled a plaintiff into investing in a defendant’s business, contrasting the
real factual circumstances with a defendant’s representations, and giving
references and sources concerning a defendant’s mental state.109
b. At Least as Compelling as Opposing Inferences
In addition, the Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor110 held that pleadings
will only survive the “strong inference” requirement if a reasonable person
would consider an inference of scienter at least as plausible as an inference
of innocent behavior from the facts alleged.111 Courts look at all the facts of
a case, not just an individual allegation, in determining whether an
inference of scienter is compelling.112 The Court in Tellabs found that the
absence of motive allegations and the failure to plead with particularity
allegations of the company flooding its customers with unwanted products

‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of
other explanations.”).
104. Eurycleia Partners, Ltd. P’ship v. Seward Kissel, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 558–59.
107. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 311–12.
108. Id. at 313.
109. Id. at 315–17.
110. Id. at 311.
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. See Tellabs, 511 U.S. at. 319–20.
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were not fatal to finding scienter because all allegations must be taken
collectively, and the plaintiff had sufficiently shown that defendants falsely
reassured public investors so that their stock price would remain strong.113
The inference of scienter need not be the most compelling interest.114 It
only needs to be strong enough that a reasonable person would deem it as
strong as any opposing inference.115 Information from anonymous sources
is not deemed as plausible as information derived from known sources.116
In weighing competing inferences, courts must take into account whether
plaintiffs allege a scheme that has any chance of achieving its putative
ends.117 For example, in In re PXRE Group, Ltd., Securities Litigation,118
the Supreme Court concluded that an inference of scienter was not as
compelling as other inferences because the defendants’ motivation to
misstate their losses to raise money and offset deficits would be odd given
the fact that they were not attempting to raise enough capital to offset their
entire losses.119 Tellabs requires that a court weigh competing inferences to
assess the validity of securities fraud claims.120 Nevertheless, while the
Supreme Court has laid out the procedural requirements for pleading a
cause of action under the “strong inference” requirement, it has yet to
clearly define the term.121 Therefore, the requisite state of mind necessary
to plead scienter remains unclear.122
C. Circuit Split About the Meaning of Strong Inference of Scienter
Although the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead a “strong inference” of
scienter to survive a motion to dismiss, neither the PSLRA nor the Supreme
Court have clearly defined the term “strong inference,” resulting in a circuit

113. Id. at. 314, 322–23.
114. Id. at 310–11.
115. Id. at 310.
116. Higginbotham v. Baxter Intern., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
117. In re GeoPharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 432, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that
opportunity to commit fraud may not exist for an alleged scheme with no chance of success).
118. 600 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
119. Id. at 533.
120. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
121. See id.
122. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the
ambiguity of the “strong inference” standard that is set out by Congress in the PSLRA).
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split.123 While all circuits agree that plaintiffs must allege a strong
inference of intent,124 the requirements for proving a defendant’s state of
mind vary in different circuits.125 Some circuits require proof of motive and
opportunity to commit fraud or recklessness, while others require proof of
deliberate recklessness.126 While the Second Circuit holds that scienter can
be proven by showing a defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit
fraud, the Ninth Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant knew
he was committing fraud.127 The application of varying pleading
requirements stems from circuits’ differing views on whether the PSLRA
codified the Second Circuit Court of Appeals scienter analysis or the
PSLRA created a more rigorous standard than that used by the Second
Circuit.128
1. The Second and Third Circuits Maintain Pre-PSLRA Understanding
The Second and Third Circuits continue to hold that a plaintiff can establish
a strong inference by pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud or
by showing recklessness.129 Thus, the PSLRA did not alter the Second
Circuit’s pre-PSLRA interpretation of scienter requirements.130

123. Id. (acknowledging the circuit split between a “majority of courts” that say the PSLRA
“essentially codified the Second Circuit’s approach” and other courts that hold that the PSLRA
“imposes an even more stringent pleading standard”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2000)
(Courts have disagreed on the proper interpretation of the new pleading requirement . . . in light of
the text of the PSLRA and its legislative history.”).
124. The Supreme Court in Tellabs reiterated the fact that all plaintiffs alleging securities fraud
must give rise to a strong inference of scienter. 551 U.S. 308, 317–18 (2007). It is also in the plain
language of the PSLRA statute, as passed by Congress. Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737.
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126. See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 530.
127. Id. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 988 (1999) (finding no strong
inference of deliberate recklessness or knowing misrepresentation).
128. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 309–10 (“[Courts] have generally come to two conclusions: (1)
[the PSLRA] effectively adopts the Second Circuit’s pleading standard for scienter wholesale . . .
[or that] (2) [the PSLRA] strengthens the Second Circuit’s standard by rejecting the simple
pleading of motive and opportunity.”).
129. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit’s holding in Rolf was
reaffirmed post PSLRA by Nathal v. Siegal, which held that plaintiff’s allegations that a defendant
had access to internal documents that would have revealed fraud satisfied scienter. 592 F. Supp.
2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
130. In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534.
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2. Other Circuits Require Pleading Intent with Particularity
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress did not intend to codify
the Second Circuit requirements in the PSLRA.131 Instead, contrary to its
pre-PSLRA relaxed scienter pleading standards,132 the Ninth Circuit now
imposes very stringent requirements to prove the defendant’s state of
mind.133 In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff must plead with great particularity
facts showing that a defendant acted with deliberate recklessness or
conscious misconduct.134 For example, in In re Silicon Graphics,135 the
plaintiff failed to plead deliberate recklessness because she did not mention
the author of the reports or a description of the contents of reports upon
which she based her belief of fraud.136 Therefore, the court did not
conclude that defendants knew they were committing fraud.137 Similarly,
the Eleventh Circuit requires pleadings that show a defendant’s severe
recklessness.138 This standard also requires a plaintiff to show that
defendants were aware they were engaging in fraudulent activity.139
Finally, the Sixth Circuit holds that plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging
facts giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness without showing that
defendants knew their acts were fraudulent; however, the bare pleading of

131. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (holding that the Ninth Circuit interprets the
PSLRA as requiring a plaintiff to plead evidence of deliberate recklessness or conscious
misconduct). See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534–35 (holding that in the Second Circuit it
remains sufficient to establish motive and opportunity or recklessness).
132. The pre-PSLRA Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs could allege scienter
simply by stating that scienter existed, without even setting forth the circumstances from which it
could be inferred. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1995).
133. Id. (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs plead deliberate recklessness
or conscious misconduct).
134. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976, 988 (discussing that unless great particularity and
incriminating facts were pled, the PSLRA would not serve its function of preventing fishing
expeditions).
135. Id. at 970.
136. Id. at 988.
137. Id.
138. McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814–15 (11th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that although the securities at issue may not have had a reasonable basis for achieving
the plaintiff’s investment goals, unreasonableness or inappropriateness of invested securities does
not meet a severe recklessness standard).
139. Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1998) (finding that
plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants knew the true value of hotel property when soliciting
buyers, and therefore did not deliberately or recklessly misrepresent the hotel’s value).
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motive and opportunity alone does not constitute a strong inference of
scienter.140
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING

In South Cherry Street, Limited Liability Co. v. Hennessee Group Limited
Liability Co.,141 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s
dismissal of South Cherry’s securities fraud claim on the basis that South
Cherry failed to plead scienter.142 Judge Kearse began by explaining that in
order to state a claim for securities fraud, a plaintiff must plead that a
defendant made a false representation as to a material fact or omitted
material information and acted with scienter in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.143
The Court discussed its interpretation of the scienter requirement
under the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements.144 The Court stated
that the plaintiff must state particular facts that give rise to a strong
inference that the defendant intended to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud”
to meet the requirement of scienter under the PSLRA.145 The Court
reasoned that a strong inference of scienter may arise when a complaint
alleges that the defendants
(1) benefitted in a concrete way and personal way from the
purported fraud . . .; (2) engaged in deliberately illegal
behavior. . .; (3) knew facts or had access to information
suggesting that their public statements were not accurate. . .; or
(4) failed to check information they had a duty to monitor.146

140. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F. 3d 542, 551–52 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
fact that defendants would benefit from an increase in stock price was relevant to show
recklessness, but defendant’s error in recognizing revenue was not so obvious that a reasonable
man would have known they were in error).
141. 573 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009).
142. Id. at 114.
143. Id. at 108.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 110 (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307–09 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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The Court determined that the defendant’s failure to monitor the fund
was not sufficient to establish scienter by following the precedent set in
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson.147 Decker held that a non-fiduciary’s failure to
identify a company’s internal problems was not sufficient to establish
scienter.148 In order for a defendant’s failure to monitor a company to
satisfy the scienter requirement, a defendant would have to fail to monitor
with the intent of aiding in fraud.149 The Court found that South Cherry
failed to allege that Hennessee knew that the statements it made were
untrue, that Hennessee knew of the falsity of the representations it gave
South Cherry, or that Hennessee should have been alerted to the falsity of
the representations.150 Therefore, South Cherry failed to plead scienter.151
The Court qualified a strong inference by applying a comparative
analysis between the inference of scienter and any opposing inferences of
non-fraudulent or non-reckless intent.152 While South Cherry urged that
Hennessee’s failure to conduct due diligence was motivated by the fact that
Hennessee wanted to receive a recommendation fee without incurring the
expense of due diligence, the Court reasoned that it was at least as
compelling to infer that Hennessee was simply negligent in discovering the
truth about Bayou.153 The Court explained that Hennessee, priding
themselves on their expertise in recommending funds, was not likely to risk
its reputation deliberately by conducting little inquiry on a recommended
fund.154
V. ANALYSIS

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the PSLRA’s
pleading standards. Nevertheless, the Court failed to correctly apply those
standards when it determined that South Cherry had not met the scienter
requirements imposed by Rule 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.155 In light of
147. See id. at 114 (holding that the allegations in the complaint did not give rise to conscious
recklessness). See also Decker v. Masser-Ferguson, 681 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1982).
148. Decker, 681 F.2d 111 at 119.
149. Id.
150. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 114.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 111 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)).
153. Id. at 113.
154. Id.
155. See infra Part V.A.
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numerous recently uncovered fraudulent schemes in the financial services
industry,156 it is clear that the public interest is best served by affording
investors greater opportunities to prosecute securities fraud claims. All
circuits should uniformly adopt the Second Circuit’s motive and
opportunity or recklessness requirements to effectively deter frivolous
securities fraud claims while empowering defrauded investors to bring
legitimate claims.157
A. Congress Intended to Uniformly Impose Heightened Pleading Standards
on all Circuits by Codifying the Second Circuit’s Pre-PSLRA Scienter
Requirements
Legislative history and the plain language of the PSLRA indicate
Congress’s intent to codify the securities fraud pleading standards
developed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that require plaintiffs to
show motive and opportunity or conscious recklessness in order to satisfy
scienter.158 At the time the PSLRA was passed, the Second Circuit’s
pleading standards were the most stringent.159 Uniform federal application
of these pleading standards fit Congress’s purpose of significantly
heightening national securities fraud pleading standards.160 In addition, the
PSLRA’s requirement that plaintiffs plead scienter with particularity of
facts tweaked the Second Circuit’s standard to prevent plaintiffs from
bringing generalized “motive and opportunity” claims.161

156. See generally, U.S. v. Stanford, 341 Fed. App’x. 979 (5th Cir. 2009); Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n v. Bernard L. Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Civ. 08 CV 10791
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
157. See id.
158. Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments
Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1024–25 (1998)
(discussing Congress’s legislative intent to codify the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pleading
standards and quoting President Clinton’s veto message that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had “the highest standard of any Federal circuit court”); see supra Part III. B(a).
159. 141 Cong. Rec. H15, 215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (President Clinton, in 1995, stated that
he was “prepared to support the high pleading standards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit—the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court”); see also supra Part
III.B.a.
160. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litg., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“In many
jurisdictions, adoption of a ‘strong inference’ standard will substantially heighten the barriers to
pleading scienter, a result Congress expressly intended.”).
161. Id. at 535.
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The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated
that the PSLRA pleading standard was “modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit.”162 Legislative history indicates that the
language adopted by Congress in the PSLRA is based in part on the Second
Circuit’s pre-PSLRA pleading standards.163 Congress also stated that it
found the body of law regarding the strong inference requirement
“instructive.”164
The Committee also reported that courts may find the Second Circuit’s
body of law instructive.165 President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA, stating that
he was not prepared to require more procedural hurdles than those imposed
by the Second Circuit.166 Although Congress eventually overrode the
President’s veto, many legislators reaffirmed the fact that the PSLRA was
intended to codify the Second Circuit standard.167 The SEC also filed
amicus briefs to several court of appeals cases litigating the PSLRA
standards.168 The briefs stated that Congress intended to adopt the Second
Circuit’s pleading standards.169
Finally, the plain language of the PSLRA mirrors that of the Second
Circuit.170 The “strong inference” of scienter language in the PSLRA is
identical to the language set out in Second Circuit case law.171 For example,
in Acito v. IMCERA Group Inc.,172 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that “plaintiffs must also allege facts that give a strong inference of
scienter.”173 Similarities between the PSLRA’s “strong inference” language
and the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit “strong inference” pleading standard
reaffirm the idea that the PSLRA was modeled after the Second Circuit’s
174
In contrast, the PSLRA’s language
scienter pleading requirements.

162. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104–369, at 41 (1995).
163. Id.
164. S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 15 (1995).
165. Id.
166. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 156, at 1023.
167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999).
171. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (stating that a plaintiff must state with particularity facts that
give rise to “a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).
172. 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.1995).
173. Id. at 53.
174. See supra note 161.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011

251

S C S! LLC " H G LLC

significantly differs from the pre-PSLRA standards of the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits, which did not require strong inference to satisfy scienter.175
B. South Cherry Had a Cause of Action Under Rule 10(b) and 10b-5
Because Hennessee Made Material False Representations; South Cherry
Relied on These Representations, and Hennessee Acted with Scienter When
it Recommended the Bayou Fund
1. Hennessee’s Material Misrepresentations
Similar to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,176 South Cherry satisfies
the first prong of a 10b-5 claim because Hennessee’s representations would
have had immediate importance to South Cherry.177 The fact that Samuel
Israel III was never head trader at Omega Investments and that the fund was
being audited by an audit group owned by the Bayou’s principal would
have been material to South Cherry’s investment decisions.178
2. South Cherry’s Reliance
Applying the Second Circuit’s reliance elements as set forth in Straub v.
Vaisman and Co, Inc.,179 South Cherry would be found to have reasonably
relied on Henessee’s representations.180 A fiduciary relationship existed
between Hennessee and South Cherry by virtue of Hennessee being an
investment adviser to South Cherry.181 South Cherry hired Hennessee to

175. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
176. 429 U.S. 810 (1976).
177. Id. at 449 (noting that a fact is material when there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important).
178. See S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that Israel had been a mere clerk prior to forming the Bayou Fund).
179. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
180. Id. at 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976) (listing the elements to find reasonable reliance as:
(1)whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; (2) whether the plaintiff had the
opportunity to detect the fraud; (3) the sophistication of the plaintiff; (4) the existence of long
standing business or personal relationships; and (5) the plaintiff's access to the relevant
information).
181. A fiduciary relationship exists between investment advisers and their investors. Sec Exch.
Com’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (stating “[t]he Investment
Advisers Act of 1940…reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship”) Additionally, in an administrative proceeding, the SEC found

252

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

D C
research the validity of Bayou’s investments specifically because South
Cherry did not possess expertise in these types of investments; therefore,
South Cherry would not have had the opportunity to detect the fraud.182
3. Hennessee’s Scienter
South Cherry also satisfied the scienter requirement of 10b-5 by alleging
that Hennessee knowingly made misrepresentations to South Cherry.183
Some of Hennessee’s misrepresentations, such as the name of the fund
auditors, were easily discoverable by Hennessee,184 enough so that
Hennessee should have known that it was making false representations to
its clients.185 Therefore, as the court in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exchange186 similarly concluded, “but for a breach of duty of inquiry,
[Hennessee] should have had knowledge of the fraud.”187 The Second
Circuit’s decision in Teamsters Local v. Dynex Capital Inc.188 stated that to
raise an inference of scienter from failure of duty to monitor, a plaintiff
must specifically identify “reports or statements that would have come to
light in a reasonable investigation and that would . . . [demonstrate] the

that Hennessee “owed fiduciary duties to their clients.” Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release
No. 2871, April 22, 2009.
182. Id. Also, while Hennessee is a secondary actor, investors showed reliance on the
defendant’s own deceptive conduct so that Hennessee could be held primarily liable. See
generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding
that in order for defendants that would normally be secondarily liable to be primarily liable,
plaintiffs must allege that the they relied on the defendant’s own conduct). Finally, even if they
had been experienced investors, the Court in Straub held that sophisticated investors should be
able to rely upon the “honesty of those with whom he deals in the absence of knowledge that the
trust is misplaced.” See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
184. See infra note 190.
185. See S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 102–03 (2d Cir.2009)
(discussing South Cherry Street’s complaint that if the Hennessee Group had performed any real
due diligence, it would have easily discovered that Israel had not been head trader at Omega
Investments and that Hetz Herson & Co. were no longer auditing the fund).
186. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).
187. Id. at 374 (holding that because plaintiffs did not allege that defendant knew or should
have known of the fraud, they did not plead a sufficient claim of securities fraud).
188. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d
Cir. 2008).
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falsity of the allegedly misleading statements.”189 Unlike the plaintiffs in
Teamsters Local, South Cherry specifically alleged that had Hennessee:
[P]erformed any real due diligence in 2004. . . it would have
discovered, inter alia, that Israel, prior to forming Bayou Fund,
had been a mere clerk, that HHCO [Hert Herson & Co.] had not
been the auditor for any of the Bayou-related funds since 1998,
and that the new auditor was not independent because it was
owned by Marino, a Bayou Fund principal.190
4. A Finding of Scienter from Failure of Duty to Monitor is Consistent with
Recent Case Law
South Cherry Street is similar to Rolf v. Blyth191 and Nathel v. Siegal,192
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Southern District of
New York, respectively, held that plaintiffs met scienter requirements by
showing defendants’ failure to monitor.193 In Rolf, a defendant who
assumed a duty to monitor by agreeing to act as investor’s broker, reassured
the plaintiff that the investment adviser was doing a good job by
recommending investments without investigating the adviser’s decisions.194
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant-broker had a
duty to determine whether the statements she made to her client had any

189. Id. at 196.
190. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103. Additionally, in 2005 the SEC charged the Bayou Group
for running a Ponzi scheme. The “red flags” that caught the attention of the SEC may indicate that
Hennessee should have known that statements made by the Bayou Fund to Hennessee were
obviously suspicious. Both SEC investigations and recent case law support a finding of scienter
from Hennessee’s failure to monitor the Bayou Fund. See Rachelle Younglai, SEC Charges
Hennessee on Bayou Hedge Fund Miss, REUTERS, (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com
/legal/banking-law-banking-finance-regulation/12409453-1.html (discussing the SEC’s charges
against Bayou for failing to properly review the hedge fund before recommending their clients to
invest); See infra Part V.A.1–2.
191. 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
192. 592 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
193. See Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80 (holding that a defendant’s aiding and abetting fraud satisfies
scienter); Nathel, 592 F. Supp. 2d. at 465 (holding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant had
access to internal documents that would have revealed fraud satisfied scienter).
194. Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80. While the Court in Rolf discussed the defendant’s fiduciary duties to
investor, there is no indication that plaintiffs specifically plead fiduciary duty on appeal. Id.
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factual basis.195 Similarly, Hennessee assumed a duty to monitor when it
agreed to perform due diligence and advise South Cherry on its hedge fund
investments.196 Without performing any of the due diligence it had agreed
to, Hennessee reassured South Cherry that Bayou was performing well.197
Likewise, in Nathel v. Siegel,198 the Second Circuit denied a motion to
dismiss a securities fraud claim, holding that the plaintiffs met scienter by
showing that defendants, investment advisers, recommended investments
and assured investors of an investment’s likely profitability and tax benefits
without proper investigation.199 The defendants in Nathel represented that
they were knowledgeable about the types of investments they were
recommending.200 The Court found that plaintiffs successfully pleaded
scienter by showing a failure of duty to monitor, and therefore recklessness,
because defendants had “made no investigation into the validity of
investments, and thus made representations to investors ‘without any
basis.’”201
South Cherry successfully alleged a duty to monitor by showing that
Hennessee failed to perform the most rudimentary due diligence on the
Bayou Fund by failing to investigate the fund auditor’s name or the
biography of the fund’s principals.202 Consistent with cases such as Rolf
and Nathel, Hennessee’s failure to check information that it had a duty to
monitor shows strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness.203
195. Id. at 47–48.
196. S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that
Hennessee agreed to perform “detailed and rigorous five step due diligence process”).
197. Id. at 102 (describing how all of the figures Hennessee Group provided to South Cherry
showed profits that were in fact large losses).
198. 592 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
199. See id. at 459.
200. Id. at 463 (stating that they were “very familiar” with the investments that they
recommended and that they “knew what they were doing”).
201. Id. at 463–65.
202. S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 103.
203. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The SEC’s contentions against Hennessee in
this matter also support their failure of duty to monitor, although they have no bearing on the
decision making of the Court. Id. In April 2009, the SEC charged Hennessee for failing to
properly review the Bayou Group hedge fund before recommending their clients to invest. Order
Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group LLC, Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April 22, 2009). The SEC
stated that Hennessee violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act by failing to “conduct a
reasonable investigation into red flags” and by relying on financial information that Bayou
handed them, rather than conducting the informed analysis that was advertised to its investor
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C. South Cherry met the Pre-PSLRA Second Circuit Scienter Requirement
by Showing a “Strong Inference of Fraudulent Intent or a Reckless
Disregard for the Truth”
South Cherry’s contention that Hennessee wanted to receive a referral fee
without incurring due diligence costs satisfies the scienter requirement as
laid out in Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,204 where the
plaintiff “barely” alleged motive, but survived a motion for summary
judgment in the Second Circuit.205 The Second Circuit has allowed
plaintiffs to satisfy scienter based on “fairly tenuous inferences.”206 In fact,
the Second Circuit stated higher scienter standards would make it almost
impossible for a plaintiff to plead scienter against a corporation.207
clients In the Matter of Hennessee Group, LLC and Charles J. Gradante, SEC NEWS DIGEST
ISSUE 2009–76,
Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2009/
dig042209 htm. Section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group LLC,
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April 22,
2009). The SEC also found that Hennessee “decided not to perform any analysis after Bayou
refused to produce its trading data.” Id. SEC enforcement investigations showed that Bayou gave
contradictory responses as to who was auditing the fund, after which Hennessee failed to
investigate Bayou’s responses. Id. The SEC investigation and findings strongly support the fact
that Hennessee did not actually review Bayou’s information, even in the face of obviously
“evasive” or “suspicious” statements that Hennessee relied on. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v.
McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.1998) (finding that defendant displayed reckless disregard
when he disclosed statements to his client that were obviously evasive or suspicious). In addition
to supporting Hennessee’s failure of duty to monitor, the SEC found that Hennessee had
“willfully” violated the Adviser’s Act, supporting the South Cherry Street’s strong inference of
scienter. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Hennessee Group
LLC, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2871, 2009 SEC LEXIS 1365, at *3 (April
22, 2009). The SEC’s charges were filed before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
decided the South Cherry in July 2009. In the Matter of Hennessee Group, LLC and Charles J.
Gradante, SEC NEWS DIGEST ISSUE 2009–76, Apr. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2009/dig042209 htm; S. Cherry St., 573 F.3d at 98 (decided on
July 14, 2009).
204. 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
205. Id. at 538.
206. Id.
207. Id. (finding that plaintiff met barely alleged motive and opportunity by alleging that
defendant wanted to use the funds and that the funds at maturity were in defendant’s control;
however, the Court would allow the finder of fact to hear the case because otherwise it would be
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to plead scienter against a corporation that did not involve
“specifically greedy comments from an authorized corporate individual”).
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D C
D. In Light of Limited Federal Oversight in the Financial Services Industry,
the Second, Third and Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of the PSLRA Pleading
Standards Best Serve the Public Interest
The Second, Third and Fifth Circuits’ application of the PSLRA as a
codification of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pleading standards
encourages private litigants to bring securities fraud actions, which help
regulate the financial services industry.208 Private securities fraud actions
are a powerful tool for securities fraud enforcement. Private actions against
hedge fund advisers are particularly important because hedge funds are
neither regulated nor transparent.209
For these reasons, the SEC opposed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
heighten the Second Circuit’s standards in In re Silicon Graphics Inc.
Securities Litigation.210 The SEC has limited resources, and cannot
prosecute all securities fraud cases, as we have seen from scandals such as
the Madoff Fund. 211 Therefore, it is essential to supplement enforcement of

208. Walker & Seymour, supra note 156 at 1003.
209. See Younglai, supra note 186 (quoting a statement made by Antonia Chion, an
associate director in the SEC’s enforcement division: “The advice that clients receive from
hedge fund consultants is especially critical when the hedge funds are neither regulated nor
transparent.”). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
[r]equires regulators to implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and bank
holding companies, to prohibit proprietary trading, investment in and sponsorship of
hedge funds and private equity funds, and to limit relationships with hedge funds and
private equity funds. Nonbank financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve
will also have restrictions on their proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity
investments.
Kristin Brost, Summary: Restoring American Financial Stability, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/FinancialReformSummary231510FINAL.pdf.
210. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). See Herbert E. Milstein, Some Recent Developments in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 5. NO. 21 ANDERLR 12, 1 (2000) (“The [SEC] stands
unequivocally against the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silicon Graphics.”). Silicon Graphics held
that the PSRLRA imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s prePSLRA standards. In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 974.
211. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). See Herbert E. Milstein, Some Recent Developments in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 5. NO. 21 ANDERLR 12, 1 (2000) (“The [SEC] stands
unequivocally against the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silicon Graphics.”). Silicon Graphics held
that the PSRLRA imposes more heightened pleading standards than the Second Circuit’s prePSLRA standards. In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 974.
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securities fraud by allowing private actors to bring cases as well.212
Adopting higher pleading standards, such as the Ninth’s Circuit’s
requirements in In re Silicon,213 may incentivize securities fraud because
the risk of private securities fraud cases brought against them would be
lowered. “If we want to continue to prosecute securities fraud actions and
give plaintiffs a more even playing field against the naturally closed,
secretive nature of corporations and their officers,” the Second Circuit’s
approach to pleading scienter furthers that purpose.214 Private securities
actions serve as a deterrent to fraud and provide a quick way for investors to
recover losses. 215
VI. CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit sets precedent in securities fraud pleading standards, as
is evidenced by the PSLRA’s codification of Second Circuit standards.216
The Second Circuit’s finding that South Cherry failed to plead the requisite
intent is inconsistent with case law.217 Hennessee’s failure to conduct
simple due diligence in the face of the Bayou Fund’s obviously suspicious
statements satisfy the PSLRA scienter requirement.218 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA pleading standards is
accurate, and should be uniformly applied in every circuit.219 More
stringent interpretations of the PSLRA impose unfair procedural hurdles for
plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims, which run contrary to the purpose
of the PSLRA and may spawn uninformed investors.220
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